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TORT LAW-PENNSYLVANIA STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY-COM-
PARATIVE NEGLIGENCE-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that comparative negligence concepts should not be extended to
strict product liability.
Kimco Development Corp. v. Michael D's Carpet Outlets, 637
A.2d 603 (Pa. 1993).
On May 10, 1983, a fire occurred at the Springfield Shopping
Center in Delaware County, Pennsylvania.' The fire started in
the basement of Michael D's Carpet Outlets ("Michael D's").2 As
a result of the fire, Michael D's store was completely destroyed
and the shopping center, which was owned by Kimco Develop-
ment Corporation ("Kimco"), was severely damaged.3 Several of
Kimco's tenants in the shopping center also suffered substantial
damages to their properties.'
Prior to the fire, Michael D's received a large shipment of
polyurethane foam padding from the General Foam Corporation
("General Foam").' Michael D's stored the foam padding in its
basement.! Because the foam padding apparently was stored too
close to the basement ceiling lights, it ignited.7
As a result of the fire, three separate actions were filed in the
Delaware County Court of Common Pleas.8 In the first, Kimco
and five of its tenants brought an action in negligence, warranty
and strict liability against Michael D's and General Foam.9 A
sixth tenant brought an action in negligence, warranty and
strict liability against Kimco, Michael D's and General Foam.10
Finally, Michael D's brought an action in negligence, warranty
1. Kimco Development Corp. v. Michael D's Carpet Outlets, 637 A.2d 603,
604 (Pa. 1993).
2. Kimco, 637 A.2d at 604.
3. Id. Michael D's had not installed a sprinkler system on the premises. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. General Foam manufactured and sold the polyurethane foam carpet
padding to Michael D's. Id.
6. Id.





and strict liability against Kimco and General Foam." The
three actions were combined to the present case. 2
There was no evidence presented at trial to indicate that Gen-
eral Foam had defectively designed, manufactured or packaged
the foam padding. 3 The jury, however, in answering special
interrogatories, 4 found General Foam liable for failing to pro-
vide warnings indicating that the foam padding was highly in-
flammatory, and that, once ignited, it would cause the "rapid
and uncontrolled spread of fire." 5
General Foam was found liable to Kimco and all tenant plain-
tiffs in the first two actions on negligence and strict liability
theories."6 Michael D's was found liable to Kimco and all tenant
plaintiffs on a negligence theory." The jury also determined, in
response to special interrogatories," that General Foam was
twenty percent negligent, and that Michael D's was eighty per-
cent negligent in causing the fire and the resulting damage. 9
The jury, however, did not apportion the overall responsibility
for the damages between Michael D's and General Foam.2" In
the strict liability action, Michael D's was awarded a judgment
of $597,934.43 against General Foam.2' The trial court did not
reduce Michael D's award by the percentage of responsibility
ascribed to Michael D's by the jury.
22
11. Id.
12. Kimco, 637 A.2d at 604.
13. Id.
14. Id. Special interrogatories are "[wiritten questions on one or more issues of
fact submitted to the jury. The answers to these are necessary to a verdict." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIoNARY 1397 (6th ed. 1990).
15. Kimco, 637 A.2d at 604.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. In answering the special interrogatories, the jury found General Foam
negligent because there was inadequate warning that the foam was inflammatory.
Id. As a result of the inadequate warning, under strict product liability theory, the
foam padding was "defective". Id.
19. Id.
20. Kimco, 637 A.2d at 604.
21. Id.
22. Id. The first two actions against General Foam and Michael D's were
brought under the theories of negligence and strict liability. Id. The jury, in return-
ing a verdict in these actions, based their determination on an apportionment of
negligence between the two parties. Id. In the third action, Michael D's received
judgment against General Foam on a strict liability theory for which consideration of
the plaintiffs negligence is not permitted. Id. Following the verdict, the court denied
Michael D's request for delay damages. Id. Delay damages are damages added "[alt
the request of the plaintiff in a civil action seeking monetary relief for bodily injury,
death or property damage . . . to the amount of compensatory damages awarded
against each defendant .. .found to be liable to a plaintiff in the verdict of a jury."
PA. R. Civ. P. 238(a)(1).
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At the conclusion of the trial, General Foam moved for post-
trial relief in the form of a judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict, a new trial, and a molding of the verdict.3 Upon denial of
these motions, General Foam filed an appeal to the superior
court. 24
The superior court affirmed the trial court's judgments in
favor of Michael D's.2' The court held that: (1) the evidence
supported the jury's finding that the fire and subsequent dam-
age occurred as a result of Michael D's and General Foam's
negligence, and General Foam's failure to warn consumers of the
highly inflammatory nature of the foam padding; (2) failure to
instruct the jury to apportion overall liability was harmless
error by the trial court;" and, (3) the comparative negligence or
fault of Michael D's could not be used as a defense by General
Foam in the action based upon strict liability.'
General Foam appealed the superior court's decision to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court."e The supreme court granted al-
locatur' to address the primary issue" of whether compara-
23. Kimco, 637 A.2d at 604. In Pennsylvania, in response to a party's motion
for post-trial relief, the court may, "(1) order a new trial as to all or any of the
issues; or (2) direct the entry of judgment in favor of any party; or (3) remove a
nonsuit; or (4) affirm, modify or change the decision or decree nisi, or (5) enter any
other appropriate order." PA. R. Civ. P. 227.1.
24. Remy v. Michael D's Carpet Outlets, 571 A.2d 446 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990),
affd sub. nori. Kimco Development Corporation v. Michael D's Carpet Outlet, 637
A.2d 603 (1993). Michael D's also filed a cross-appeal from the trial court's denial of
delay damages. Remy, 571 A.2d at 448.
25. Remy, 571 A.2d at 453. However, the superior court reversed the trial
court's denial of delay damages and remanded to the trial court the question of
whether the amended Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 238 entitled Michael D's
to delay damages. Id.
26. id. at 451. The error occurred as a result of the trial court instructing the
jury to apportion negligence and failing to instruct the jury to apportion liability
fully for the fire between General Foam and Michael D's as co-defendants in the
first two actions. Id. at 450-51. This matter was remanded to the trial court to
correct the calculation error and apportion overall contribution between the two
parties on the basis of the jury's finding that General Foam was twenty percent
negligent and Michael D's was eighty percent negligent. Id. at 453.
27. Id. at 452. The superior court, in refusing to allow the use of comparative
negligence concepts to permeate a strict product liability action, relied on the su-
preme court's ruling in McCown v. International Harvester Co. Id. (citing McCown v.
International Harvester Co., 342 A.2d 381 (Pa. 1975)). See notes 71-78 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of McCown.
28. Kimco Development Corp. v. Michael D's Carpet Outlets, 637 A.2d 603
(Pa. 1993).
29. Kimco Development Corp. v. Michael D's Carpet Outlets, 592 A.2d 1302
(Pa. 1991). Allocatur is a word which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania uses to
describe allowance of appeals; it means "it is allowed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 75
(6th ed. 1990).
30. Kimco, 637 A.2d at 605. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also considered
two additional issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence against General Foam was
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tive negligence concepts should be used as a defense in strict
product liability actions brought under Section 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts ("Section 402A)."
The court held that comparative negligence concepts should
not be extended to cases brought under Section 402A. 32 The
court stated that conceptual problems would be created if negli-
gence concepts were intermixed with strict liability concepts.'
The court also asserted that the application of comparative neg-
ligence would undermine the purpose of strict product liabili-
ty.' The court opined that the purpose behind strict liability
sufficient to hold it liable when the "alleged" product defect (failure to warn) was
not the legal cause of the fire and when there was conflicting testimony amongst
the various experts at trial; and (2) whether Michael D's was entitled to delay dam-
ages pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 238. Id. See note 22 for the
text of Rule 238. As to the first isse, the court concluded, after reviewing the lower
court opinions and the record, that General Foam's argument was without merit.
Kimco, 637 A.2d at 605. The court further concluded that arguments concerning the
second issue were premature because the superior court had remanded the case to
the trial court for determination as to whether, under Rule 238, delay damages were
justified. Id.
31. Id. The Restatements of Law are a "series of volumes authored by the
American Law Institute that tell what the law in a general area is, how it is chang-
ing, and what direction the authors (who are leading legal scholars in each field
covered) think this change should take." BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 1313 (6th ed.
1990). Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
The supreme court adopted Section 402A in Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853 (Pa.
1966). Kimco, 637 A.2d at 606. See notes 41-45 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of Webb. Its effect on Pennsylvania's Comparative Negligence Act, Pub. L. No.
202, No. 53, § 10(89), (codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7102 (1982 and Supp. 1994),
had not yet been before the court. Kimco, 637 A.2d at 605.
32. Kimco, 637 A.2d at 606.
33. Id.
34. Id. In support of this proposition, the court cited Kinard u. Coats Co.,
wherein the Colorado Court of Appeals determined that the policy considerations
behind the establishment of the liability of manufacturer's under Section 402A strict
product liability required that negligence concepts be kept out of strict product liabil-
ity. Kimco, 637 A.2d at 605 (citing Kinard v. Coats Co., 553 P.2d 835 (Colo. App.
1976)). The court also cited the following cases in support of the proposition against
allowing negligence concepts to infiltrate strict product liability actions: Roy v. Star
Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979) (ap-
plying Rhode Island law); Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976)
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was that the risk of loss for injuries caused by defective products
should be borne by the suppliers, who are in better position
financially to absorb any losses incurred as a cost of doing busi-
ness and, if necessary, redistribute these costs to consumers in
the form of price adjustments."5 The court considered that in
the present era of nationwide industry, decisions favoring the
burgeoning manufacturing industries were no longer of
precedential value. 6 As a result, the court concluded that the
supplier must bear the risk of loss caused by a defective product
without regard to fault or privity of contract.37 The court also
stated that allowing actions based upon strict liability to be
defeated or recoveries reduced by negligence concepts, would
lessen the deterrent effect gained by imposing strict product
liability standards.38
Justice Flaherty, in a dissenting opinion, stated that compara-
tive negligence concepts should be applied to product liability
actions brought in accordance with Section 402A. 9 He asserted
that imposing liability on product manufacturers without regard
to fault would amount to an excessive burden on business enter-
prises to the detriment of society.'
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court first adopted Section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as the law of Pennsylvania
in Webb v. Zern.41 In Webb, the plaintiff was injured when a
beer keg exploded.42 The supreme court, in addressing the issue
of the nature and scope of the liability in trespass' of those
who produce and market a defective product for use or consump-
tion, extended the law of strict liability in tort to defective prod-
ucts, thereby formally adopting Section 402A.44 The court, how-
(applying Nebraska law); Young's Machine Co. v. Long, 692 P.2d 24 (Nev. 1984);
Correia v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033 (Mass. 1983); Seay v.
Chrysler Corp., 609 P.2d 1382 (Wash. 1980); Smith v. Smith, 278 N.W.2d 155 (S.D.
1979). Kimco, 637 A.2d at 606.
35. Kimco, 637 A.2d at 606 (citing Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co., 391 A.2d
1020 (Pa. 1978)).
36. Kimco, 637 A.2d at 606.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 607.
39. Id. (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
40. Id.
41. 220 A.2d 853 (Pa. 1966).
42. Webb, 220 A.2d at 854. The plaintiff sued the distributor of the keg, the
brewer who had filled the keg, and the manufacturer of the keg. Id.
43. An action in trespass is a "form of action brought to recover damages for
any injury to one's person or property or relationship with another." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIoNARY 1502 (6th ed. 1990).
44. Webb, 220 A.2d at 854. The plaintiff, because he had no knowledge of the
cause of the explosion or which party defendant was responsible, brought the action
1994
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ever, provided little explanation as to the basis of its decision to
adopt Section 402A; instead, it referred to the concurring and
dissenting opinions of the court's decision in Miller v. Preitz.45
Justice Jones' concurring and dissenting opinion in Miller
provides a background of the status of product liability law in
Pennsylvania preceding Webb v. Zern." Prior to the formal
adoption of Section 402A, a plaintiff injured by an alleged defec-
tive product could bring an action: (i) in assumpsit 47 based on a
breach of an implied warranty or, (ii) in trespass based upon
negligence. 4' In either action, the plaintiff was required to es-
tablish privity" and, in the case of a negligence action, the
plaintiff had the difficult task of attributing specific acts of neg-
ligence to the defendant."0
Justice Jones, in describing the development of Pennsylvania
based upon the theory of exclusive control. Id. Under this theory, where a product is
shown to be under the control of the defendant or his servants and the occurrence
of an accident is such that ordinarily the accident would not have occurred had
proper care been taken, the occurrence of the accident provides a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the accident arose due to carelessness. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 564
(6th ed. 1990) (this theory is also known as res ipsa loquitur). The trial court dis-
missed the complaint on the exclusive control theory because of the plaintiff's failure
to join as defendants his father, who had purchased the keg, and brother, who had
tapped the keg. Webb, 220 A.2d at 854. Since the recognition of Section 402A was
determinative of the appeal, the supreme court did not determine whether the lower
court had erred in reaching this decision. Id.
45. 221 A.2d 320 (Pa. 1966), overruled by, Kassab v. Central Soya 246 A.2d
848, 852 (Pa. 1968). In this case, the plaintiff, the administrator of the estate of a
young child who died as a result of injuries sustained from a malfunctioning vapor-
izer-humidifier, brought an action in assumpsit contending breaches of implied war-
ranties of merchantability against the manufacturer, distributor and retailer of the
vaporizer-humidifier. Miller, 221 A.2d at 321-22. See note 47 for the definition of
assumpsit. The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court and held that the
actions against the manufacturer and distributor could not be maintained due to
lack of privity of contract. Miller, 221 A.2d at 325. The court, however, allowed the
decedent to maintain an action against the retailer without the necessity of privity.
Id.
46. Miller, 221 A.2d at 328-35 (Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
47. Id. at 329. Assumpsit is defined as "a common law form of action which
lies for the recovery of damages for the non-performance of a parol or simple con-
tract; or a contract that is neither of record nor under seal." BLACK'S LAW DICTIO-
NARY 122 (6th ed. 1990).
48. Miller, 221 A.2d at 329 (Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
49. Id. at 329, 330. Privity is composed of both horizontal and vertical privity.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1199 (6th ed. 1990). Horizontal privity is defined as refer-
ring to "those who are not in the distributive chain of a product but who, nonethe-
less, use the product and retain a relationship with the purchaser, such as a mem-
ber of the purchaser's family." Id. Vertical privity "refers to the relationship between
those who are in the distributive chain of a product." Id. at 1200.




liability law, stated that following the decision in MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co,5 Pennsylvania, along with the rest of the na-
tion, abolished the requirement of privity in a negligence ac-
tion. 2 In an action based upon assumpsit, however, the re-
quirement of both horizontal and vertical privity remained. 3 As
a result of the privity requirement, the liability of a manufactur-
er in a breach of warranty action was limited to his immediate
vendee who, generally, was a retailer who resold the product to
the consumer.' This retailer was normally only liable to the
actual purchaser and not to subsequent users of the product.55
Justice Jones recommended the elimination of the privity
requirement, the adoption of Section 402A, and that trespass
should be the basis of all future product liability actions.6 He
proffered that the adoption of Section 402A would serve the
purpose of protecting the consumer by forcing the manufacturers
to assume the financial responsibility for all injuries caused by
their products."
In Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Co.,' the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court provided additional discussion on the develop-
ment of product liability law. 9 In Berkebile, the plaintiffs hus-
band was a pilot who was killed in a helicopter accident.'0 The
plaintiff brought wrongful death and survival actions"' against
the manufacturer of the helicopter based upon strict product
liability under Section 402A.6" The defendant contended that
the helicopter was not defective and that the accident was
caused by the victim's failure to activate the emergency equip-
ment installed on the helicopter and the victim's negligent oper-
51. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). MacPherson is the seminal opinion written by
Judge Cardozo eliminating the requirement of privity in negligence actions. See
MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.
52. Miller, 221 A.2d at 329 (Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
53. Id. at 330.
54. Id. at 332.
55. Id. at 332-33.
56. Id. at 333.
57. Miller, 221 A.2d at 334 (Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
58. 337 A.2d 893 (Pa. 1975).
59. Berkebile, 337 A.2d at 898.
60. Id. at 897.
61. Id. A wrongful death action is defined as a "lawsuit brought on behalf of a
deceased person's beneficiaries that alleges that death was attributable to the willful
or negligent act of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1612 (6th ed. 1990). This is
distinguished from a survival action, which is an action "for personal injuries which
by statute survives death of [the] injured person." Id. at 1446.
62. Berkebile, 337 A.2d at 897.
1994
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ation of the helicopter." The supreme court affirmed the supe-
rior court's reversal of the trial court and held for the plain-
tiff." The court opined that contributory negligence was not a
viable defense in a strict product liability action and that to
allow the introduction of an assessment of the seller's or the
user's actions would undermine the policy considerations sup-
porting the idea that the manufacturer should guarantee the
safety of its product."5
The court found that these policy considerations were a result
of the increasing complexity inherent in the relationship be-
tween the seller and the ultimate user of a product." As a re-
sult of intricate manufacturing and distribution processes, the
plaintiff incurred the arduous burden of proving negligence on
the part of the seller. 7 This task could be insurmountable,'
and the court recognized that changing societal concerns dictat-
ed that a seller should be held liable for the injuries caused by
his defective products.69 The supreme court, therefore, reiterat-
ed the holding in Webb that the seller of a product was liable for
injury caused by his defective product regardless of the fact that
he had exercised due care in the manufacture, design and distri-
bution of the product.7"
In McCown v. International Harvester Co.,71 the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court further expounded upon its explanation of
the policy considerations behind the acceptance of Section
402A.72 McCown involved a plaintiff who was injured while
driving a tractor manufactured by the defendant.73 The defen-
dant argued that the plaintiffs contributory negligence in collid-
ing with a guardrail should have been taken into consideration
63. Id. at 897-98. The helicopter allegedly ran out of fuel. Id.
64. Id. at 897.
65. Id. at 900.
66. Id. at 898.
67. Berkebile, 337 A.2d at 898.
68. Id. The difficulty in proving negligence arose as a result of the increas-
ingly tangled array of manufacturers and distributors that came between the final
purchaser and the initial manufacturer of a product. Id. As more and more individu-
als came in contact with a product, it became difficult for the injured consumer to
establish causation. Id.
69. Id. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1965).
70. Berkebile, 337 A.2d at 899.
71. 342 A.2d 381 (Pa. 1975).
72. McCown, 342 A.2d at 382.
73. Id. at 381. While driving the tractor, the plaintiff struck a guardrail caus-
ing the steering wheel to change direction rapidly. Id. The spinning wheel's spokes
struck the plaintiffs arm, resulting in injuries. Id. The force and speed of the coun-
ter rotation were determined to have resulted from a defect in the design of the
steering system. Id. at 381-82.
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when determining the extent of the plaintiff's ability to recover
damages. 4 The court rejected this contention and held that
contributory negligence should not be used as a defense in a
product liability action.7" It reasoned that to do so would serve
to eliminate a "theoretical basis" relied on by the court in adopt-
ing Section 402A.7" This "theoretical basis" was that by placing
a product on the market, the manufacturer tacitly asserted that
its product was safe when used as proscribed, and a consumer
could reasonably rely on this assertion when using the prod-
uct.7" The court further reasoned that if contributory negligence
were allowed to permeate the strict product liability field, the
consumer's presumption of safety would be contradicted."
In Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co.," a decision echoing and
expanding upon Berkebile and McCown, the supreme court reaf-
firmed its position that negligence concepts should not be ap-
plied to a strict product liability action. 0 In Azzarello, the
plaintiff was injured when his hand was caught in a machine
manufactured by the defendant.81 The plaintiff subsequently
brought an action under Section 402A. 2 The defendant joined
the plaintiffs employer and asserted that the negligence of the
employer was a factor in bringing about the employee's inju-
ries." At trial, the employer was found liable while the manu-
facturer" was relieved of liability for the plaintiffs injuries.'
The plaintiff, in appealing the decision, argued that the trial
judge's instructions to the jury constituted error because, though
the term is delineated in Section 402A, the instructions improp-
erly required the plaintiff to prove that the machine was "unrea-
sonably dangerous."' The supreme court affirmed the decision
of the superior court and expounded upon its decision in
Berkebile regarding the "unreasonably dangerous" charge. 7
74. Id. at 382.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. McCown, 342 A.2d at 382.
78. Id.
79. 391 A.2d 1020 (Pa. 1978).
80. Azzarello, 391 A.2d at 1023.
81. Id. at 1022.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. The manufacturer was the defendant in this case. Id.
85. Azzarello, 391 A.2d at 1022.
86. Id. The superior court granted the motion for a new trial stating that, in
light of the supreme court's decision in Berkebile, using the phrase "unreasonably
dangerous" in charging the jury with respect to the manufacturer's liability constitut-
ed the requirement of a grant of a new trial. Id. at 1023.
87. Id.
1994
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In examining the propriety of a charge to the jury requiring
the product to be "unreasonably dangerous," the supreme court
narrowed the issue to whether a charge invoking this require-
ment constituted the introduction of negligence concepts into a
strict product liability action." The supreme court concluded
that use of the term "unreasonably dangerous" would result in
the introduction of negligence concepts, and endorsed an alter-
nate charge to be given to a jury which eliminated the use of the
term. 9
While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has continued to
adamantly oppose the introduction of negligence concepts into
strict product liability actions, other courts around the country
have been less hesitant to do so.' The California Supreme
Court, in Daly v. General Motors Corporation,9 reached a re-
sult contrary to the position taken by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court.
In Daly, the driver of an automobile was killed when his door
inadvertently opened after the car collided with a fence.' The
plaintiffs brought an action against the manufacturer of the
automobile under strict product liability asserting that the de-
sign of the door latch was defective and the resulting defect
caused the decedent's death. 3
88. Id. at 1025.
89. Id. at 1027. The charge proffered by the court emanated from the court's
Committee for Proposed Standard Jury Instructions, Civil Instruction Subcommittee,
which provides:
The [supplier] of a product is the guarantor of its safety. The product
must, therefore, be provided with every element necessary to make it safe for
[its intended] use, and without any condition that makes it unsafe for [its
intended] use. If you find that the product, at the time it left the defendant's
control, lacked any element necessary to make it safe for [its intended] use or
contained any condition that made it unsafe for [its intended] use, then the
product was defective, and the defendant is liable for all harm caused by such
defect.
Id. at 1027 n.12 (quoting PENNSYLVANIA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTION 8.02 (CMIL),
SUBCOMMITrEE DRAFT (June 6, 1976)).
90. Kimco, 637 A.2d at 606. See, e.g., Coney v. J. L. G. Industries, Inc., 454
N.E.2d 197 (Ill. 1983) (holding that comparative negligence principles could be ap-
plied in product liability actions); Sandford v. Chevrolet Division of General Motors
Corporation, 642 P.2d 624 (Or. 1982) (holding that the negligence of a driver injured
in an auto accident could be used to limit her recovery, in a strict product liability
action against a tire manufacturer and tire seller).
91. 575 P.2d 1162 (Cal. 1978).
92. Daly, 575 P.2d at 1164. The plaintiffs in this case were the widow and
children of the driver who was killed as a result of the automobile accident. Id.
Evidence was established at trial that had the victim not been ejected from the car
he would likely have sustained only minor injuries. Id. at 1164-65.
93. Id. at 1164. The plaintiffs also sued several other companies in the "manu-
facturing and distribution chain.* Id. The defendants introduced evidence demonstrat-
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The California Supreme Court determined that the outcome of
the case rested on the issue of whether comparative negligence
principles should be used to diminish the defendant's liability in
a strict product liability action." In resolving this issue, the
court examined policy arguments that had been made by those
courts that prefer to maintain an impregnable wall between
negligence and strict product liability concepts.95
After examining the history of strict product liability actions,
the court considered the contention that the concepts of negli-
gence and strict liability were so diametrically opposed that a
merging of the two concepts would be a conceptual error.' In
dismissing this argument, the court reasoned that product liabil-
ity actions should not be restricted by a distinction based on a
fixed definition of legal concepts, but instead should be allowed
to evolve in order to achieve a result that provides for fairness to
both the defendant and the plaintiff.97 Furthermore, the court
asserted that comparative negligence entailed a merger of the
contributory negligence defense 8 and the defense of assump-
tion of the risk.9
ing the availability of and the victim's failure to use a "seat belt-shoulder harness
system" and a door lock, contending that had one or both been employed by the vic-
tim, he would have remained in the vehicle. Id. at 1165. In addition, the defendants
admitted evidence that, at the time the incident occurred, the victim was intoxicat-
ed. Id. The defendants prevailed at trial and the plaintiffs' appealed the decision
asserting that the evidence of the victim's non-use of the safety equipment and his
alleged intoxication were improperly presented to the jury. Id.
94. Id. at 1165.
95. Id. at 1166. The California Supreme Court first examined the history of
strict product liability actions and noted that its decision in Greenman v. Yuba Pow-
er Products, Inc., was one of the first to sanction the strict product liability action
and that the principles elicited in Greenman were embodied in Section 402A. Id.
(citing Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963)). The court
stated that the principles behind the decision in Greenman were primarily the need
to protect consumers and the inadequacies inherent in negligence and warranty
actions. Daly, 575 P.2d at 1166. Furthermore, the court reiterated its avowed pur-
pose in deciding Greenman which was "to insure that the costs of injuries resulting
from defective products are borne by the manufacturer that put such products on
the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect them-
selves." Id.
96. Id. at 1167.
97. Daly, 575 P.2d at 1167.
98. Id. Contributory negligence was formerly thought to be unjust to the plain-
tiff because of its "all or nothing" results. Id.
99. Id. The court elaborated on this idea in providing the following explana-
tion:
As for assumption of the risk, we have recognized in this state that this de-
fense overlaps that of contributory negligence to some extent. That in one kind
of situation . . . where a plaintiff unreasonably undertakes to encounter a
specific known risk imposed by the defendant's negligence, plaintiffs conduct,
although he may encounter that risk in a prudent manner, is in reality a
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The court also noted that in an action asserting both the neg-
ligence and strict liability of a manufacturer, a plaintiff who
assumed the risk of his conduct would be unable to recover in
the strict liability action." The plaintiffs same conduct, how-
ever, would only limit his award in a negligence action."1 A
plaintiff, therefore, by suing in strict liability would be deprived
of a remedy to which he would be entitled in a negligence ac-
tion." 2 One of the purposes of the establishment of strict liabil-
ity, freeing the plaintiff from difficulties involved in pursuing
negligence and warranty actions, would be defeated."0 3 The
court opined that this unjust result could only be obviated by
applying comparative negligence principles to strict liability
actions and abandoning the defense of assumption of the
risk.1'4 The defenses, therefore, to both strict liability and neg-
ligence actions would be given similar treatment."5
The court then examined whether the effect of recognizing
comparative negligence principles in strict liability actions would
discourage manufacturers from developing safer products.0 ' In
concluding that it would not result in this form of impropriety,
the court pointed to the fact that the manufacturer's liability
was not extinguished by the merging of these concepts, it was
only mitigated to the extent of the plaintiffs negligence." 7 The
court reasoned that a manufacturer could never assume that a
particular plaintiff would in fact be negligent.' Consequently,
form of contributory negligence. We think it clear that adoption of a system of
comparative negligence should entail the merger of the defense of assumption
of the risk into the general scheme of assessment of liability in proportion to
fault in those particular cases in which the form of assumption of risk in-
volved is no more than a variant of contributory negligence.
Id.
100. Id. at 1169. This is as a result of assumption of the risk being an affirma-
tive defense in a strict liability action.
101. Id.
102. Daly, 575 P.2d at 1169.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1169-70.
105. Id. The court next examined the policy of holding the manufacturers strict-
ly liable in order to allocate the costs of injuries to the manufacturers, who are best
able to sustain the costs and pass them on to their customers. Id. at 1168-69. The
court reasoned that this policy would not be defeated by the introduction of compar-
ative negligence concepts into strict liability actions. Id. at 1169. The costs for inju-
ries sustained due to a defective product, while reduced by the negligence attributed
to the victim, would remain the responsibility of the manufacturer. Id. Requiring the
costs attributable to the victim's conduct to be placed totally upon the manufacturer
would put an unjust burden upon the rest of society. Id.
106. Id. at 1169.




a manufacturer would continue to be exposed to complete liabili-
ty and thus, the production of safer products would remain a
paramount consideration in product development." 9 Therefore,
the California Supreme Court held that there were no policy
considerations sufficient to overcome the "substantial justice"
that would result by the introduction of comparative negligence
principles into strict product liability actions.1 'In Murray v. Fairbanks Morse,"' the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, applying Virgin Islands law, also addressed the issue of
whether comparative negligence principles should be applied to
a strict product liability action."2 In Murray, the plaintiff was
injured when a portion of a control panel collapsed and caused
him to fall ten feet onto a concrete floor."' The plaintiff
brought an action against the manufacturer of the panel under
both Section 402A strict product liability and negligence."
14
In affirming the district court's decision to reduce the
plaintiffs award in accordance with the jury's determination of
fault, the Third Circuit opined that the difficulty in applying
comparative negligence principles to Section 402A actions was
that the defendant's conduct was not at issue."5 It reasoned
that a jury, in reaching its verdict, could not compare the
defendant's conduct and the faulty conduct of the plaintiff."'
To solve this anomaly, the court asserted that a comparison
should instead be based upon each party's "causative contribu-
tion" to the harmful incident.' The court contended that the
damages should be based upon a determination of the amount of
the injury attributable to the defect and the amount attributable
to the plaintiffs conduct."8 The court held that applying com-
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1172. The court did, however, reverse the lower court and find that
the evidence of the victim's intoxication and failure to utilize safety devices was
improperly admitted. Id. at 1174.
111. 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979).
112. Murray, 610 F.2d at 150.
113. Id. at 151.
114. Id. The jury found the manufacturer liable for the plaintiffs injuries. Id.
However, in answering special interrogatories, the jury determined that the plaintiffs
negligence proximately caused his injuries and that he was five percent at fault. Id.
at 150. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff but reduced his award in
accord with the jury's determination of fault. Id. The plaintiff appealed the decision
asserting that it was error to allow the plaintiffs negligence to reduce an award
grounded on Section 402A. Id. The Third Circuit, therefore, affirmed the district
court's decision. Id.
115. Id. at 159.
116. Id.
117. Murray, 610 F.2d at 159.
118. Id. The court discussed the procedure that should be used in applying this
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parative negligence principles in strict liability actions would
result in a fairer distribution of the costs of injuries caused by
defective products.116
Similarly, in Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc.,120 the Illinois
Supreme Court examined whether comparative negligence prin-
ciples could be applied to strict product liability actions.' In
Coney, the administrator of the decedent's estate brought wrong-
ful death and survival actions (grounded upon strict product
liability) against the manufacturer of a hydraulic aerial work
platform. 2 2 The trial court refused to allow the defendant to
assert the comparative negligence of the decedent and his em-
ployer as a defense. 23 On appeal, the supreme court consid-
ered the issue of whether comparative negligence principles
could be introduced in strict product liability actions. 2"
The Illinois Supreme Court held that in an action where dam-
ages are caused by both a defective product and a plaintiffs
malfeasance, comparative fault should be used to discount the
plaintiffs award by the amount that his actions contributed to
the injuries." The court also eliminated the defenses of mis-
use and assumption of the risk in strict product liability actions."6
system of "comparative causation." Id. at 160. First, the court explained that the
jury should separately determine whether the product defect and the plaintiffs con-
duct were each a "cause in fact" of the resulting injury. Id. A "cause in fact" is
"tihat particular cause which produces an event and without which the event would
not have occurred." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 221 (6th ed. 1990). If the conduct of
both parties was determined to be a "cause in fact" of the injury, then the jury
should consider whether their actions were a "proximate cause" of the injury.
Murray, 610 F.2d at 160. "Proximate cause" is defined as "that which, in a natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury and without which the accident could not have happened, if the injury be one
which might be reasonably anticipated or foreseen as a natural consequence of the
wrongful act." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1225 (6th ed. 1990). Upon concluding that
the product defect was both a "cause in fact" and a "proximate cause" of the injury,
the defendant is strictly liable. Murray, 610 F.2d at 160. However, if the jury also
determined that the plaintiffs actions were both a "cause in fact" and a "proximate
cause" of the injury, the award would be reduced accordingly. Id.
119. Murray, 610 F.2d at 162.
120. 454 N.E.2d 197 (Ill. 1983).
121. Coney, 454 N.E.2d at 199.
122. Id.
123. Id. The trial court certified three questions for appeal as designated by
Illinois rules of procedure. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court granted defendant leave to
appeal and thereby addressed the three certified questions, the following of which is
pertinent to the foregoing discussion: "[wihether the doctrine of comparative negli-
gence or fault is applicable to actions or claims seeking recovery under products
liability or strict liability in tort theories." Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 204.
126. Coney, 454 N.E.2d at 204. In reaching this decision, the court, echoing
Daly, stated that the use of comparative negligence principles in strict product liabil-
Recent Decisions
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has remained steadfast in
its refusal to follow the majority of other jurisdictions in allow-
ing the application of comparative negligence principles to strict
product liability actions. The thrust of the court's refusal ap-
pears to be centered on the conceptual difficulties encountered
by "extend[ing] negligence concepts to the area of [Section] 402A
strict product liability."' This difficulty, however, may be alle-
viated by replacing the word "negligence" with the term "causa-
tion," as in the cases that have applied comparative negligence
concepts to strict liability actions. This concept of determining
causation is not foreign to a strict liability action in Pennsylva-
nia. As discussed in Berkebile, a plaintiff must prove the defect
was a proximate cause of the resulting injuries. 2' Further-
more, as the superior court pointed out in Kimco, in failure to
warn cases the manufacturer's liability is determined through
the use of negligence concepts.' Implicitly, there is already
some application of negligence concepts in strict product liability
actions. Thus, "extending negligence concepts" into strict product
liability actions is not as great a leap as the supreme court ap-
pears to believe.
The better view, therefore, would be to apply comparative
negligence concepts in the form of comparative causation or
fault, to strict product liability actions as asserted by the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Murray.' The jury would
examine the causative contribution of each party. Upon deter-
mining that the manufacturer's defect was both a cause in fact
and a proximate cause of the injury, the jury should then exam-
ity actions would not affect the policy basis behind the concept of strict product
liability. Id. at 202. The plaintiff remained free from the requirements of proving the
manufacturer's negligence or establishing privity. Id. The court also maintained that
the manufacturer remained strictly liable thereby sustaining the incentive to produce
safe products. Id. The court, however, charged that the plaintiff would be responsible
for that portion of damages resulting from his own misconduct. Id.
127. Kimco, 637 A.2d at 606.
128. Berkebile, 337 A.2d at 901. See notes 58-70 and accompanying text.
129. Remy v. Michael D's Carpet Outlet, 571 A.2d 446, 451 (Pa. Super. 1990),
affd sub. nom. Kimco Development Corp. v. Michael D's Carpet Outlet, 637 A.2d
603 (1993). The court stated that:
Notwithstanding what some courts have said, in establishing this ground of
recovery, the plaintiff in most states must prove negligence in the failure to
warn properly. There will be no liability in these cases without a showing that
the defendant knew or should have known of the risk or hazard about which
he failed to warn. Moreover, there will be no liability unless the seller or
manufacturer failed to take the precautions that a reasonable person would
take in presenting the product to the public.
Remy, 571 A.2d at 451.
130. See notes 111-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of Murray.
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ine the plaintiffs conduct. If the plaintiffs conduct is also both a
cause in fact and a proximate cause of the injury, the award
should be reduced accordingly. In addition, the defense of as-
sumption of the risk should be eliminated and a plaintiffs con-
tributory negligence should only be used to diminish a plaintiffs
recovery.
Failure to take this course of action and apply comparative
negligence concepts to strict liability actions would lead to un-
just decisions, as was argued by the defendant in Coney.' The
argument made in Coney, similar to that discussed by the court
in Daly, was that maintaining a comparative negligence system
exclusive from actions founded upon strict liability can lead to
rather absurd results."2 In a negligence and strict liability ac-
tion against a manufacturer, for example, a plaintiff who as-
sumed the risk of his conduct would be able to recover in the
negligence action; however, the same plaintiff would be barred
from any recovery in a strict liability action.'33 In addition,
were the plaintiff merely contributorily negligent, his award
under the strict liability action would be intact, while his negli-
gence award would be reduced accordingly.
134
Pennsylvania, which allows the defense of assumption of the
risk in strict liability actions3 ' and does not allow comparative
negligence concepts in strict liability actions, remains suscepti-
ble to this type of a result. This outcome defeats one of the pur-
poses for the development of Section 402A."3 6 A plaintiff, who
assumes the risk and is injured by a manufacturer's product,
would be forced to pursue a negligence action and not an action
based on strict product liability. The plaintiff would then be
confronted with the difficulties inherent in bringing negligence
actions; difficulties which precipitated the development of strict
product liability in the first place.'37
The policy considerations underlying the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court's decision in Kimco, will not be adversely affected
by applying comparative negligence principles to strict product
liability actions. The policy of placing the costs of injuries upon
the manufacturers who can absorb and redistribute the costs
will remain in effect. The plaintiffs recovery will only be dimin-
131. Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, 454 N.E.2d 197, 200 (I1. 1983).
132. Coney, 454 N.E.2d at 200. See notes 100-04 and accompanying text for the
Daly court's discussion of the possible unjust results.
133. Coney, 454 N.E.2d at 200.
134. Id.
135. Berkebile, 337 A.2d at 901.




ished by that portion for which he is deemed responsible. The
court in Murray examined a flaw in the policy of requiring the
manufacturer to bear all of the costs of the resultant injury.'35
In failing to consider the plaintiffs conduct, the manufacturer is
forced to pay for losses due to both the defective product and the
plaintiffs conduct."9 As a result, the public is forced to pay an
"artificially inflated" cost for the product, which is an inaccurate
depiction of the risk involved in using the product."' As a re-
sult of the inflated cost, consumers may opt to purchase inferior,
less reliable products.' This would undermine the consumer's
presumption of safety, which was an additional policy consider-
ation advanced by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
McCown.1"
The policy consideration of lessening the manufacturer's in-
centive to produce safer products will also not be undermined, as
pointed out in Daly.' The manufacturer is not absolved of lia-
bility when comparative negligence concepts are applied to strict
liability actions; instead, its liability is merely lessened to the
extent of the plaintiffs negligent conduct." Because it could
never assume a plaintiffs negligence, the manufacturer would
remain exposed to full liability and the incentive to produce safe
products would remain. " '
The policy considerations which the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has so dutifully held onto as a basis for its refusal to al-
low comparative negligence concepts to apply to strict product
liability actions will not be threatened. Therefore, there remains
little basis for not allowing comparative negligence concepts to
apply to strict liability actions. However, because the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court remains adamant in its stance against ap-
plying comparative negligence principles to strict product liabili-
ty actions, any change in this area will likely require legislative
action. This would not be unprecedented as this has been done
in other states whose courts have been opposed to this
concept."'




142. See McCown, 342 A.2d at 382.
143. Daly, 575 P.2d at 1169.
144. Id.
145. Id. See notes 106-10 and accompanying text for the Daly court's discussion
of negligence principles discouraging manufacturers from developing safer products.
146. The Illinois Supreme Court in Coney discussed an example of this which
occurred in Colorado. Coney, 454 N.E.2d at 202. In Kinard, the Colorado Court of
Appeals had declined to allow comparative negligence concepts to apply to strict lie-
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In conclusion, the application of comparative negligence prin-
ciples to strict product liability actions is arguably the most
equitable way to apportion costs between manufacturers, injured
parties and society. Until the Pennsylvania legislature enacts a
measure applying comparative negligence principles to strict
product liability actions, this author believes that the consumer
will ultimately bear the burden of the current system in the
form of increased prices.
John G. Byrne
bility actions. Kinard v. Coats Co., 553 P.2d 835, 838 (Colo. App. 1976). Subsequent-
ly, the Colorado legislature enacted a comparative fault provision in Colorado's prod-
uct liability statute, which, in the opinion of the court in Coney, rendered the
Kinard case of "little precedential value.' Coney, 454 N.E.2d at 202.
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